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The homebuilding industry plays a significant role
in molding the American suburbs. An analysis of the business
factors to which this industry is most responsive provides a
background from which to predict the likely shape of the sub-
urbs over the next decade. Based on a case study of the major
homebuilders in the Washington metropolitan area, this thesis
seeks to determine to what extent the emerging shape of the
suburbs is consistent with our country's conception of an ideal
urban growth pattern.
The case study reveals that, while the sixties were
characterized by the production of exclusive housing enclaves
with most units priced above $40,000, the seventies will see
a shift to larger-scale subdivisions of 'basic' units, priced
under $35,000 and aimed at younger families. This shift is
primarily a result of two factors: the appearance of young
families aged twenty-two to thirty-five as the numerically
dominant homebuyers, and the growth in market share of the,
giant, professionally-managed homebuilding firms.
The new housing of the seventies will be produced in
significantly greater volume than that of the sixties, but it
will continue to be grouped into projects which have no em-
ployment centers nearby, which are responsive to only a narrow
spectrum of consumer desires, and which are virtually closed
to minority and lower-income families. Hence, the builders
will be serving the national goal of vastly expanding the sup-
ply of housing, but they will do little to make this housing
conform to national desires for high-quality community develop-
ment.
There are many business factors which make 'quantity'
more readily attainable than 'quality': mass-production is
easier when concentrating on one house type than many, mar-
keting is less risky and production easier when offerings are
kept within a narrow price range, a sixteen-hundred unit pro-
ject built over four years is more flexible to shifts in de-
mand and less burdened with holding costs than a five-thousand
unit project built over ten years, and a project composed
solely of residential construction is easier to coordinate
than a program of residential as well as non-residential land
uses.
These burdensome constraints on the achievement of
quality development can be lightened significantly through
both private and public efforts. For instance, the builder
will be able to offer a wider variety of house types and a
broader mixture of land uses if he can expand his volume and
develop the managerial capability to handle a more diversified
business.
Public efforts might include the improvement of local
and national market data gathering, the revision of building
and subdivision codes, and the more accurate matching of zoning
policies with market realities.
Thesis Supervisor: John T. Howard,
Professor of Urban Studies and
Planning
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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
There is growing concern in the United States over
the emerging shape of the suburbs. When predictions are made
that the present housing stock will probably double over the
next twenty-five years, we cannot help but be apprehensive
about where all this new growth will take place and what it
will look like. We are apprehensive because so many of to-
day's suburbs are displeasing when judged by such criteria
as efficiency of land use planning, openness of housing op-
portunities, and responsiveness of house and community to
consumer desires.
In order to work toward correcting the ills of
suburbs as we know them today, it is important that we
achieve a fuller understanding of the homebuilding process.
Homebuilders are key actors in the process of creating the
suburbs. They play a major role in determining whether a
parcel of land will contain low-, medium-, or high-priced
units; whether it will contain all single-family homes or
will have a mixture of housing types; whether residents will
have commercial, recreational, and employment facilities near-
by or whether these non-residential land uses will be at great
distances; and whether homes will be grouped into isolated
50-unit sub-divisions or into 1000-family communities.
How builders decide all these issues is the ana-
lytical focus of this paper. The objective of the study is
i
to predict, based on the decision-making process of builders,
the likely nature of suburbs as they will emerge over the
next decade, and to discover strategies that might alter the
emerging shape so as to conform more closely to this country's
conception of an ideal urban growth pattern.
The analysis in this paper follows a case study ap-
proach. The focus is on suburban growth in the Washington,
D. C. metropolitan area, where, in 1970, there were 27,588
housing starts. With this volume of production, Washington
accounts for about 1.5% of all U. S. housing starts and is
the seventh largest housing market in the country.1 Washington
is therefore an instructive case study for two reasons: one,
its mammoth annual volume of housing starts is making a
major long-term impact on the suburban landscape, and two,
it foreshadows what may happen in other, currently smaller,
housing markets in five to ten years when these 'younger'
areas achieve the magnitude of expansion that Washington has
today.
The case study of Washington begins, in Chapter
One, with an analysis of how two simultaneous occurrences
in the late 1960's combined to create conditions for major
changes in the pattern of suburban homebuilding in the
1970's. One occurrence was the emergence of the 'young
marrieds' group - new families aged 22 to 35 - as the
numerically dominant housing consumer. The other occurrence
"Ten Top Housing Markets," Washington Post, March 6, 1971.
p. D2.
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was the emergence of a significant number of large, pro-
fessionally-managed homebuilding firms. The significance
of the young marrieds group is that they create a high-
volume demand for three and four-bedroom homes priced under
$32,000. The significance of the new large-scale home-
building firms is that they are the first builders with the
capacity to provide both high volume and lower-priced units.
Therefore, in the 1970's, there will be a shift in type of
housing unit offered, away from the over-$40,000 'luxury'
models and into the under-$32,000 'basic' models. There
will also be a dramatic increase in the scale of housing
projects. In the 1960's, the typical house was built in
subdivisions of about 75 acres and 300 homes. To build more
rapidly and at increased volume in the 1970's, the average
housing project will likely grow to 400 acres and 1000 homes.
And because of the increase in scale and decrease in price,
the typical subdivision will be located on the fringes of
the existing metropolitan area.
Chapter Two examines in greater detail the process
by which the large homebuilding firms decide what kind of
housing projects to build in the coming decade. The policy
of focusing on the under-$32,000 price range is based on
demographic analysis and production constraints. The
preference for projects of 300 to 600 acres results from a
trade-off of production economies versus holding costs and
timing risks. And the location of projects on fringe sites
is a response to land costs and land assembly considerations.
iii
Chapter Two further refines the prediction for
Washington's new housing with an analysis of the range of
people and land uses that will be included in the typical
projects. Based on consumer research and past marketing
experience, builders have decided to offer a narrow range
of house prices within any one community. This policy is
likely to create a series of fairly homogeneous com-
munities in terms of income, which will in turn create homo-
geneity in terms of age, class, and race. Turning to land
use, the level of managerial know-how, combined with pro-
duction feasibility studies and market analysis, has led
builders to plan communities with primarily residential-
oriented facilities. The builders almost uniformly plan to
ignore any possibility of their developing employment
centers in concert with residences.
Chapter Three compares the predicted pattern of
suburban development with the country's goals.for urban
growth as expressed in the 1970 Housing and Urban Develop-
ment Act: in the coming decade builders will contribute
significantly toward the goal of rapidly enlarging the stock
of housing, but they will do little to fulfill the ideals
of quality community development. Tn order to guide builders
toward greater sensitivity to consumer tastes, toward the
provision of a fuller variety of housing opportunities, and
toward the development of a dynamic and well-planned mix of
land uses, Chapter Three makes several proposals.
iv
To become more responsive to consumer desires,
builders require a more ready availability of market data.
Local governments could help by centralizing their market
information in one office and in one publication. And the
Federal Government could help by establishing a national
information-gathering network. In addition, to augment the
privately conducted consumer analysis, government agencies
might also consider direct investigation into the vicissitudes
of homebuyer preferences.
Turning to the problem of widening the range of
suburban housing opportunities, there follows a discussion
of several key barriers: lack of real Federal commitment to
this goal other than in new towns, middle class preferences
for homogeneous communities, and high housing costs. Chapter
Three suggests that the implicit policies of the Federal
Government and the merchant builders are accurate reflections
of the housing preferences of the majority of suburban home-
buyers today, and that these policies will not change sub-
stantially until consumer desires ch-ange.
Tackling the problem of high housing costs, the
Federal Government has shown relatively greater vigor in
attempting to close the gap between market-rate prices and
the ability of low- and moderate-income families to meet
these costs. Some local governments have been active on
this front as well. Chapter Three describes promising
local government efforts to lower construction costs through
revision of regulatory codes, but observes that these
v
actions must be accompanied by more massive public subsidies
and revised Federal housing programs.
Chapter Three also explores means by which market-
oriented zoning policies could enhance the quality and lower
the cost of new suburban development. A proposal for im-
posing realistic financial constraints on land use and pop-
ulation targets is outlined.
And finally, Chapter Three suggests ways of improving
the mix of land uses in suburban communities: local govern-
ments could zone land for employment centers on their own
motion if homebuilders do not seek such zoning within or
near their projects; builders might widen their administra-
tive and production capabilities to include simultaneous
development of residential and industrial land; and builders
and public officials could be offered improved training
programs in the areas of construction and land development
management.
Vi
CHAPTER ONE
SIGNS OF CHANGE
New housing in the Washington area over the past
five years has offered great variety in terms of price,
architecture, location, and mix of land uses. Yet for all
this variety, there is an unmistakable homogeniety within
any one housing project. If housing projects are classified
according to acreage, population, and housing mix, a pattern
emerges which helps describe the suburbs of today and which
helps predict what shape the suburbs will take in the next
decade.
CLASSIFICATION OF HOUSING PROJECTS:
Housing projects, when classified by size and mix
of housing, fall into five categories:1
1This analysis is based on location maps of housing projects
as presented in The Washington Post and Evening Star real
estate sections throughout the month of September, 1970; and
on Homeseekers' Guide to Fairfax County, Virginia, by Joel
C. Miller, Washington Center for Metropolitan Studies. These
sources record location of housing projects and the price
range of housing offered. Information on acreage and pop-
ulation at the various projects was gathered directly from
the builders, from sales brochures, from planning studies,
and from newspaper accounts.
1
-2-
Total
Category Acreage
Total # of
Hsg Units
I. Small single-
product
project
II. Medium-sized
single-
product
project
III. Large-sized
multi-
product
project
IV. Giant multi-
product
project
V. New Town
10
to
100
100
to
350
350
1000
800
and
up
2000
and
up
10
to
300
250
to
1500
1000-
2500
1500
and
up
8000
and
up
all one type,
could be town-
house single
family, or
apartment
i
Mix of townhouses,
single-families,
and often garden
apartments
"1
townhouses,
singles, garden
apartments, high
rise apartments
The small single-product projects (I) tend to be in
close-in locations, priced at $40,000 and up, and aimed at
middle-aged couples -- aged 35 to 55 -- moving to their
second home.
The medium-sized single-product projects (II) are
slightly further out, but are also high-priced and aimed at
the middle-aged market. Recreational facilities are
generally included.
Housing
Types
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Hap of Washington Metropolitan
Aroa, showing typical locations
of housing projects
I Small single-
product project
II Medium-sized
single-product
III Large-Sized
multi-product
IV Giant multi-
product
V New Town
I
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The large multi-product project (III) is typically
in a 'middle ring' location (beyond the Beltway, 40-60
minute rush hour drive to Washington) or on the fringe, and
offers single family units, townhouses, and some garden
apartments, mostly priced around $40,000. Such projects
include neighborhood shopping facilities and recreational
amenities.
The giant multi-product project (IV) is consistently
in a fringe location - an hour's drive in rush hour from
downtown - and aims at the under $35,000 market. Commercial
and recreational facilities are included.
The new town (V) is much Iike the giant multi-
product project, but offers a full range of housing types
and prices, plus an employment center.
In sum, the bigger the project, the further out of
town it is, the lower the price unit offered, and the broader
the offering of ancillary land uses within the project.
These trends are easily explained. Small sites only are
available close to the city - these sites are expensive and
support only higher-priced housing, so long as high density
is not allowed.
Larger tracts with a sizeable number of housing units
must aim at a broad market in order to sell quickly, and
today the 'mass' market is in the under $35,000 unit. And
the larger the project, the lower the per house cost for
amenities.
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Between 1965 and 1969, the majority of new housing
was built within small and medium-sized single product
projects, During that time, there were only two new towns
and three giant projects,1 and these large-scale develop-
ments accounted for under five percent of all housing starts.
CHANGES OF THE TYPICAL PRODUCT IN 1970:
1970 marked a turning point, however, with the
readily-apparent success of two large-scale multi-product
developments2 aimed at the lower-priced market and the
equally apparent lack of success of medium-sized higher-
priced housing projects.
Tight Credit:
At first, the explanation of these successes and
failures was based on high interest rates and inflation:
the decision to buy a higher-priced unit is discretionary,
and can be postponed until more favorable credit returns,
while young expanding families have a hard time finding
adequate room in cramped apartments in a literally no-
vacancy market.
Demographic Shifts:
In fact, though, credit conditions merely accentuated
lNew towns: Reston, Montgomery Village; giants: Bel Aire,
Sterling Park, Dale City..
2 Greenbriar, Sugarland Run.
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basic demographic facts: in 1970, one-quarter of all
Washington households were headed by persons under age 35;
by 1980 this fraction will jump to one-third. The 1970's
housing market will therefore be dominated by the 'young
marrieds.'
Age of Head
of Household
less than 34
35-44
45-64
65 and up
1970
26%
19
37
18
100
1975
29%
16
34
21
1.00
1980
34%
17
30
19
100
Age Distribution of Heads of Households,
Washington Metropolitan Area
Hammer, Greene, Siler Associates. "The Economy of Metro-
politan Washington." Wash. D. C." Metropolitan Washington
Council of Governments. 1970, p. 34.
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Response of Builders to Shifting Demand:
Builders were slow to respond to shifting demo-
graphic trends; they were most comfortable producing what
they always had produced.1 But 1970 forced a re-assessment
of marketing strategy: higher-priced houses just were not
selling, and builders were left either with a substantial
inventory of unsold houses or of unbuilt debt-incurring
land.
The higher-priced builders had only to look at the
unparalleled sales success of Levitt's Greenbriar - selling
450 lower-priced units in the midst of the 1970 credit
squeeze - to realize that their own policies were amiss. With
the catalysts of debt service cost on land and the need to
regain and exceed pre-1970 volume in order to sustain over-
head, the builders went through a swift re-evaluation of
the housing market. They finally recognized the full meaning
of the population and income trends which had been emerging
for the past five years.
1William Wheaton observed this inertia, writing," ... most
residential building is undertaken on the basis of hunch,
intuitive feel of the market, and experience with last
year's product in last year's location. These tend to make
producer responses to changes in taste very slow and in-
cremental." In Melvin Webber (editor). Explorations into
Urban Structure. Philadelphia, Pa.: U. of Penn. Press.
1964. p. 169.
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MAGNITUDE OF THE UNDER -$35,000 HOUSING MARKET:
It is not surprising, then, that many builders
decided to shift to the under -$35,000 market. Over the
next ten years, there is likely to be a demand for 125,000
units in this price range. Out of a total demand this
coming decade for 350,000 housing units (single- and multi-
family combined), this represents 35% of the total market,
and about 60% of the single-family market. 1 There will be
roughly 90,000 additional families over the next ten years
seeking the lower-priced homes, and there is a pent-up de-
mand among existing households for the lower-priced homes,
of about 35,000.2 The pent-up demand is so high because
A 1970 FHA Housing Market Analysis for Washington predicted
the 350,000 figure, based on a projected population increase
of 1,400,000 between 1970 and 1980.
The proportion of single versus multi-family homes
is harder to predict than total demand; today 50% of housing
starts are single-family units, but the average over the
decade is likely to be 60% single-family, because the garden
apartment construction boom is quickly catching up with past
pent-up demand. Washington Post, February 20, 1971.
'building Permits Issued, Washington Metropolitan Area,"
p, D3. Study by Homer Hoyt Institute.
2These figures are based on Census data showing the existing
and projected number of households of given ages and incomes,
for the Washington area. Assumptions regarding incomes re-
quired to purchase homes in the $22,000 to $32,000 price range
are explored further in Chapter Two.
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this market was largely unserved until 1970. Based on
natural increase alone, there is a demand for 9000 homes a
year. If pent-up demand were met over three years, there
would be an additional demand of 11,700 a year between 1971
and 1973. In the early years of this decade, then, there is
a potential demand of 21,700 per year, and after 1974, for
9000 per year. It is unlikely that builders will gear up
quickly enough to meet the full existing demand year by
year. By 1973, builders may be able to provide 12,000 to
15,000 lower-priced units a year, so the actual supply will
continue to lag significantly behind the demand, at least
until 1976, and probably for the rest of the decade as well.
CHANGE IN THE NATURE OF THE HOUSING PRODUCER:
In part because of this awakening to demographic
trends, the kinds and relative numbers of various housing
projects will differ substantially, by 1975, from what
existed prior to 1970. Another significant factor in the
impending change in suburban housing projects is the nature
of the housing producer. As late as the mid-sixties,
housing was considered the industry that modern American
business had left behind. Nationally, more than 90% of all
building firms were relatively small operations, each
producing fewer than one hundred houses a year but together
accounting for about 60% of all single-family houses and
50% of all apartments built. Today the small firm still
-10-
builds the majority of single family housing, but has
shrunk back to a 20% share of the multi-family field. 1
Increasing Market Share for Large Builders:
It is clear, especially in rapidly growing metro-
politan areas such as Washington, that the market dominance
of the small firms is quickly fading. In 1970, Washington's
six largest builders (Boise Cascade, Levitt, Freeman, Hylton,
Yeonas, Kettler) together built 5250 housing, units, out of
a total for the Washington area of 27,588; their collective
market share was thus 19%. In 1971, these six firms project
a minimum of 7500 housing starts. With Washington's total
market predicted to be 30,000, the six firms will be in-
creasing their market share to 25%.
In addition to the growth of the existing giant
builders, there are at least five Washington firms which
anticipate growing to giant status over the next three
years. These companies built 1650 units in 1970, and anti-
cipate building 2400 in 1971, thereby increasing their market
2
share from 6.4% to 8.0% in one year.
1Michael Sumichrast. A Profile of the Builder and His
Industry. Washington, D. C. National Association of Home-
builders. 1971, p. 108.
2The five growing firms and their 1969 gross dollar volumes,
are Brisker-Campitelli ($12 million), Cary ($11 million),
Sterling Park ($10 million), Berlage-Bernstein ($7 million),
and Miller and Smith ($7 million). The dollar volumes are
from the "Annual Report of Housing Giants," in Professional
Builder, July, 1970. Pp. 60-75.
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1970 1971 Percentage Increase
between 1970 and
1971
# of Housing Starts
by Washington's Six 5250 7500 43%
Largest Firms
# of Housing Starts
by Five Big Growing 1650 2400 44%
Firms
Total # of Housing
Starts by the eleven 6900 9900 43%
firms
Total # of Housing
Starts in Washington 27,588 30,000 10%
Metropolitan Area
Share of Market by
the Eleven Firms 25% 313%
Increasing Market Dominance
by Large Homebuilding Firms1
This changing balance of market power has a significant
bearing on the shape of the suburbs, because the large and
small firms differ substantially in terms of their production
capability and business philosophy.
1 Data on total Washington housing starts in 1970 is from current
building permit data; 1971 projection is made by Michael
Sumichrast, chief economist of the National Association of
Homebuilders.
Data on 1970 and projected 1971 housing starts by the eleven
builders is based on conversations with builders, plus pub-
lished information in the Washington Post, Evening Star, and
Professional Builder magazine.
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In order to assess the impact of the changing nature
of the housing producer on the shape of the suburbs, let us
briefly examine the different types of builders: small,
medium, large, and giant.
Classification of Builders:
Type of Builder Volume Per Year Type of Project
Small under 25 custom homes
small single-product
project (I)
new town (V)
Medium 25-100 small single-product
project (I)
medium-single-product
project (II)
new town (V)
Large 100-500 medium single-product
project (II)
large multi-product(III)
Giant 500 and up large multi-product (III)
giant multi-product (IV)
new town (V)
Small and Medium Builders:
Small builders usually have only one or two executives,
often former carpenters who do some on-site work themselves.
Critics point out that small firms generally have difficulties
with estimating, budgeting, and accounting, since the prin-
cipals of the firm rose to their positions from technical,
not business, backgrounds. 1
1lMartin Meyerson, Barbara Terret and William L. C. Wheaton,
Housing, People, and Cities. New York: McGraw Hill Book
Co., Inc. 1962. pp. 111-112; Glenn Beyer, "Housing - A
Factual Analysis," in Housing and Society. New York:
Macmillan Co. 1965. p. 85.
Owners of medium-sized firms tend to be more business-
men than craftsmen. They have often come from related
fields of business, such as real estate brokerage, building
materials, or banking. Despite past experience, though,
their ability to cope with financial and planning aspects
of the firm is still rudimentary, both because the owners
are not familiar with better techniques and because the volume
of business cannot absorb the overhead of trained specialists.
The small builder's firm is typically composed of
an owner-builder, a bookkeeper, and possibly one full-time
laborer and one full-time carpenter. The medium builder
usually has, in addition, a sales manager and a construction
superintendent. The remaining functions required to build
and market houses are performed outside the firm. (See
organization chart) 2
Meyerson, pp. 111-112. Sumichrast, p. 163.
2Ernest L. Buckley. Residential Construction Management.
New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 1959. p. 13.
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ORGANIZATION CHART OF MEDIUM SIZED BUILDER
nr-buildie
larchitect sales
sales mgr..);
__ - - - _ I'-1 - [ - -
accounting finance developer
(1 clerk) (banker) HIland
(mortgagee (panning)
lConstr. Super intendent
,Suppliers'
Subcontractors
carpentry, concrete, electric plumbing
direct-hire
crews
(variable no.
-- = permanent staff
--- = temporary staff
The small and medium firms engage in little or no
market research. Only 8% of the small firms and 18% of
the medium-sized firms report that they formally engage in
market analysis. 1 More commonly, the product offered by
these firms is based on intuition and past experience. Hence
these firms rarely innovate or respond 'on time' to shifts
in demand.
Also cutting down on the stability and responsiveness
of the small and medium firms are their tenuous credit
1Sumichrast, p. 163.
masonrV paint'
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arrangements. Advance mortgage commitments are rarely sought
or received, so in periods of tight money, these firms are
the first to go out of business for lack of money.1
New Town Developers:
Because the small and medium firms are so completely
specialized in production, they have found that new towns
offer them significant advantages over striking out on their
own. The new towns are typically coordinated by a developer,
who obtains zoning, assembles and finances land, analyzes
the market, master plans the mix of housing units and other
land uses, establishes a timetable of development, and arranges
construction and permanent financing. The developer then sells
or otherwise contracts with the small and medium builders to
produce an approved design and price housing unit in a given
location in a given time period.
New town developers at Columbia, Reston, and Irvine,
agree that the managerial coordination, land planning, market
research, and financing offered by new towrs fits in perfectly
with the firm structure of the small and medium builders.
Attempts by the new town developers to work with larger builders
have been a failure, however, because.the large builders re-
sent the degree of control over the final product that the
developer seeks and they find that there is too much overlap
Gene Saminski. HUD study of Montgomery County, Maryland,
builders between 1965 and 1970 (unpublished to date).
John Herzog. The Dynamics of Large-Scale Homebuilding,
University of Cal: Real Estate Research Program, 1963, p. 23.
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in functions that the developer and the builder both can
provide.1 The price at which new town land is made avail-
able to builders must cover the overhead costs of the de-
veloper, so were the large builder to work in a new town,
he would be forced to pay for services for which he had no
need.
Large Builders:
The large builder's firm is not as fully specialized
as the staff of a new town developer, but is adequate to
provide internally some market feedback, sales strategy, and
financial planning, in addition to production. (See organ-
ization chart) 2
From conversations with James Rouse (President, Rouse Co.,
Columbia), Glenn Saunders (Executive Vice President, Gulf-
Reston), Robert Watson (Executive Vice President of Irvine).
2Buckley, p. 17.
Organization Chart of Large Builder
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With this staff, the large builder has the capability of
acquiring and planning substantial acreage.
In Washington, there is a wide variation in the
degree of management sophistication among the large firms.
Many large firms are still craftsman-oriented. They rely on
intuitive hunches about the market and fail to coordinate
their land inventory with financing availability and feasible
production scheduling. Such firms are relatively untouched
by modern management practices and appear to have risen to
high-volume status because they were fortunate enough to do
business in a booming market.
Other large firms are just the opposite and it is
these firms which are making plans to expand into giant status
over the next three to five years. Such firms are headed
by management-oriented men who recognize the full range of
functions that must be performed to produce a house and who
have a good grasp of how to coordinate these many activities.
Giant Builders:
The giant firms are the most specialized of all the
builders. They have the largest, most sophisticated staffs,
and the most management-oriented apptoach. They include in
some form, all the specialties required to produce housing.
(See organization chart)
Organization chart of Levitt and Sons, 1969. This is a highly
abbreviated chart. Each vice president has an extensive staff
in the central office, and each regional manager has a local
staff, oriented toward construction, sales, and servicing.
Organization Chart of Giant Builder
IPresident I
Executive
Vice Presidenti
Marketing Legal
Vice President IVice Presidenti
Field
Manage~rs
Puerto IFrancel
Rico
Operations
Vice President!
Technical
Vice President!
Fiscal
Vice Presidentl
(Regional Managers!
New Long IFlioridal ign
Jersey Islandl ,epartmentl
Community
Planner
H
| Maryland!I
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They are thus capable of producing many large projects, a
few giant projects, or a new town. Additionally, since
giants are often national companies, they frequently operate
in more than one metropolitan area.
Number of Locations Worked by Small and Large Firms:
Comparing firms producing over one hundred units to
those producing under one hundred units annually, the National
Association of Homebuilders recently found that forty percent
of the big firms work at four or more sites at once, compared
with only twelve percent for small and medium firms. 1
# of Locations Large and Giant Small and M4edium
Builders Builders
scattered lots 3% 20%
1 17 28
2-3 40 40
4 and up 40 12
Differences in Typical Product of Small and Large Firms:
There are some significant differences between the
product of the firms producing over 100 units and those pro-
ducing under 100 units. As volume increases, house price and
lot size drop, in the single-family sector; among apartment
builders, as volume increases, rent levels and the provision
of amenities rises.
1 Sumichrast, p. 160.
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Large and Giant Small and Medium
Builders Builders
SINGLE-FAMILY
UNITS
Price (median) $24,200 $26,100
Lot Size (median) 7700 sq. ft. 11,400 sq. ft.
MULTI-FAMILY
UNITS
Rent $141 $131
% of Units Including:
Swimming Pool 42.6% 8.8%
Tennis courts 12.9% 1.6%
Recreation Center 29 . 7% 8~ 3%
Comparison of Product of Smaller and Larger
Builders in 19691
FUTURE SUBURBAN PROJECTS OF THE BUILDERS:
Given this breakdown of types of builders, we can move
closer to an explanation of the shape of the suburbs that
will emerge over the next decade.
Within the Beltway, Small and Medium Builders:
Remaining land within the Beltway that is zoned for
fewer than six units per acre will continue to support only
higher-priced housing. And because these parcels are small,
1Sumichrast, p. 110-136.
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they will be the sole domain of the small and medium builders.
Typical of such projects will be Greenway Heights, a forty-
seven acre upper-income community, located eighteen minutes
from the city, in McLean, Virginia. Greenway Heights plans
a total of 93 single-family homes, selling for $60,000 to
$90,000. The project has been underway for three years, and
has sold fifty homes so far. The builders, Groover and
Cooley, are a typical small firm; the principals are actively
involved in the carpentry, and they hire additional workmen
and other specialists as needed.
Also typical of close-in housing projects are the
'contemporary communities' called Timberwood, built by Matthews-
Schwartz. This firm specializes in steep slopes, and since
rough terrain is one of the main types of Land that tends to
be left over after the major thrust of subdivision develop-
ment has taken place, these builders should. have ample op-
portunity to ply their trade over the next decade. They
currently offer homes in three different locations, one each
in Virginia, Maryland, and Washington, none more than a
fifteen minute drive from downtown. Each site has a dif-
ferent basic model, but all are single-family units, con-
temporary in architectural design, and dramatically sited
to take advantage of the hilly terrain. The Virginia homes
sell for $45,000, the Maryland units. fo-r $6.0Q00 , and the
Washington units for $63,000. Each community contains ten
to twenty-five homes.
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Within the Beltway: Large Builders:
The larger builders will operate in close-in locations
only if the small scattered sites are zoned adequately to
sustain a high-volume operation. Such projects are likely to
be garden or high-rise apartments, and could be aimed at any
income range. Levitt Multi-Housing Corporation is actively
seeking close-in land to launch its apartment operations;
Westinghouse, already active in cities, is also seeking suit-
able suburban apartment land. Levitt would aim at the un-
subsidized market, while Westinghouse specializes in govern-
ment-sponsored housing. At the upper-income level, Magazine
Brothers, a major Washington multi-family builder, plans to
build a 500-unit luxury apartment project on the Alexandria
shoreline. Other luxury units are planned along the Potomac
shoreline in Maryland.
Beyond the Beltway:
It is in the area beyond the Beltway, however, that
most new development will take place, so itis here that our
inquiry focuses. This new growth is likely to differ in
many aspects from the suburban development of the past five
years, because builders themselves have changed and because
their perception of the housing market has shifted in strategy
and improved in accuracy. Chapter Two, therefore, will be
an exploration of the decision-making process of the builders
and a projection of the kinds of developments they are likely
to produce.
CHAPTER TWO
WASHINGTON HOMEBUILDERS: WHAT THEY
PLAN TO BUILD AND WHY
PRODUCTION CONSTRAINTS AND MARKET ANALYSIS:
Builders, like all businessmen, perform a delicate
balancing act. At any given time their firms are structually
geared in terms of manpower and physical facilities for some
optimal volume of output of a given mix of products. A firm
geared up to produce 500 units, but able to sell only 350,
will have trouble covering overhead expenses and will run a
deficit. So the builder is eager to discover the design and
price-range house that allows him to attain his optimal vol-
ume without undue risk. To do this, he first looks at the
nature of the housing consumer and the activities of his
competitors. Suppose the builder discovers that there is
demand in 1971 for 3,000 homes priced between $50,000 and
$60,000, but that. other builders plan to provide only 2400
such units in the coming year. He would be confident that
he could sell his 500 units if he provided this kind of
product. But he would have to ask two further questions to
determine whether this production strategy were suited to
his firm: first, how long is this high volume of demand
likely to last, and second, how many houses of this type can
be built at any one site.
24
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Duration of Demand:
The builder is concerned about the duration of demand
for a given product because his men and his facilities will
work most efficiently if they can concentrate on one product
over a period of time. This is particularly true of the
larger builders, because they would have more to re-gear if
change were called for by shifting demand.
Demand at a Given Site:
The volume of homes that can be sold at any one site
is critical because, the fewer the sites required, the easier
it is to oversee production.
On both counts, duration of demand, and volume of de-
mand at a single site, the higher-priced homes represent
danger to the builder. As discussed in Chapter One, the
population in Washington is growing younger, and the middle-
aged, middle-income couples are a shrinking market. Addi-
tionally, these older homebuyers are traditionally scattered
throughout the metropolitan area: they typically seek homes
reasonably close to town (40 minutes at most at rush hour)
and in communities that give some sense of exclusiveness.
Builders serving this market hence have generally not been
able to exceed a volume of sixty sales per year at any one
location.1
1Otis Costin, president of Miller and Smith. Miller and Smith
until this year, has concentrated in luxury homes, but their
desire to increase volume has led them to abandon the high-
priced units and aim for the under -$40,000 price range.
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The nature of the higher-priced housing market is
thus unsuited to the builder producing- 250 units or more
a year. A builder under that volume could viably operate
in three or four locations, if he felt he could overcome
the problem of the shrinking market. In fact, this is just
what is happening. The big builders are deserting this
market en masse. The smaller builders, because of their
minimal staffs, are most able to fluctuate from year to
year in volume as demand shifts, and the low sales rate at
any one site is quite adequate for their needs.
The big builder, then, is still looking for a product
to offer. He has two kinds of alternatives: he can seek
one product that allows him to achieve substantial volume
at each of a number of sites, or he can try a mix of pro-
ducts that multiplies his volume and allows him to con-
centrate on a single site. Each alternative has its trade-
offs: it is easier to build just single-family houses than
to build singles plus townhouses, but it is harder to over-
see operations at five or six sites than at one or two. Another
problem of operating at multiple sites is that the different
projects done by a single builder become competitive with
each other.1
The giant Washington builders take these factors
into account in a variety of ways,, but most firms share
1Fred Kober, regional director, Boise Cascade.
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similar ideas as to project scale, price range, and price
spread.
PROJECT SCALE:
Project scale is determined primarily by considerations
of holding costs and production economies. Since all the
builders work in the same business environment, the choice
of project scale is made in roughly the same way at each
firm.
From the standpoint of production, the builders all
seem to set the following minimums: they want to be able
to produce at least one hundred units a year at any one
site, and they want to be able to continue working at that
one site for at least three years.
Looking at holding costs of raw and improved land,
the builders all feel that five years is the maximum they
can profitably spend at any one site.
Given these parameters, the actual amount of acreage
and number of units at one site is a function of allowable
density, price of the raw land, and size of the various
submarkets.
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Decision-Making Model:
Raw Land Cost N Land Cost/Unit
Allowable Density 1 )9 Improvement Cost/Unit
Interest Rates on loans
Construction costs
Size of each Price of Homes
s ubmarke t
Annual;Demand for Allowable Density
Each House Type
Holding Costs Number of Acres Production
of raw and needed annually economies
improved land
TOTAL NUMBER OF ACRES,
TOTAL NUMBER OF UNITS
OF EACH TYPE
TOTAL POPULATION
To see how these factors come into play in the firm's
decision-making process, we shall examine in detail the
thinking of Boise Cascade and the Yeonas Organization, two
of the giant Washington builders. These particular firms
are of interest because they illustrate how two builders
with substantially different past histories have come to
almost identical conclusions as to what makes sense in
the 1970's market.
Boise Cascade is the nation's largest homebuilding
firm; its 1970 dollar volume was just over a quarter billion.
The firm is active in recreation communities, mobile home
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production, industrialized housing research and develop-
ment, and conventional single- and multi-family homebuilding.
As a national firm, it operates in at least a dozen different
metropolitan and rural locations. Boise entered the Washington
housing market in 1969, and since then has built about 300
homes. Now fully staffed, the firm anticipates a 1971 volume
of 1000 units. The Washington homebuilding operation is part
of the parent company's "shelter group," which is just one
among several of the conglomerate's business activities.1
The Yeonas Organization is a local family firm
which has built five thousand homes in thirty Washington
area subdivisions over the past twenty-three years. The firm
expanded gradually for many years, but began growing in
earnest in 1969 when it was acquired by the Olin Corporation.
Its 1969 volume was 500 units; in 1970, volume rose 50%, to
750; in 1971, the firm hopes to exceed 1100 sales. Yeonas
traditionally has offered higher-priced homes in communities
ranging from seventy to two hundred acres, but began to
change in 1970 with the opening of the 400-acre Lake Braddock,
a lower-priced community in Fairfax County, Virginia.
Boise, unlike Yeonas, began its Washington activities
with the lower-priced communities. Boise is basing its
future policies on experience gained in three early projects:
Brandywine, Sugarland, and Pheasant Run. Brandywinsis a
1Professional Builder. "Housing's First Conglomerate?"
May, 1969. pp. 88-92.
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1700 acre residential community in Prince George's County,
Maryland. Boise plans to house 6000-families in 2000 single-
family units, 2500 townhouses, and 1500 apartments. Ap-
proximately 150 single-family units, plus a golf course,
have been built so far, plus a townhouse model area.
Sugarland is a 500 acre project for 2000 families in Loudoun
County, Virginia. Again, the project started with single-
family units, but will offer townhouses and possibly garden
units as well. Pheasant Run, now completed, is a 20 acre,
170-unit townhouse project in Laurel, Maryland. All three
projects offer homes for $22,000 to $32,000, and are located
fifty to seventy minutes from downtown-at rush- hour.
After experimenting with projects at three substantially
different scales, Boise has decided that, when fully entered in
the Washington market, they plan to have two or three planned
communities of about five hundred to one thousand acres, and
three or four smaller jobs, of two hundred to three hundred
acres, for a total of five to six projects.
Choosing a Metropolitan Area: In choosing to enter
the Washington market initially, Boise considered its pro-
duction and marketing constraints. Boise will not begin op-
erations in any area that cannot absorb a minimum of-one
thousand Boise units annually for at least ten years. Any
shorter time period or lower number of sales would be in-
sufficient to justify the start-up and overhead costs
associated with the local office.
-31-
From the standpoint of competitive risks, Boise is
unwilling to aim for more than five percent of any one local
market. Experience has shown that in periods of market down-
turn, small builders absorb the majority of the cut in de-
mand, while the large builders are able to maintain close to
their normal sales rate. Growing beyond the five percent
market share, however, would probably subject the large firms
to reduced sales as well. 1
The 1000 unit minimum and five percent maximum com-
bine to establish the criterion that a metropolitan area must
have a total housing demand for at least 20,000 units annually.
Washington clearly meets these criteria, since the predicted
demand for the seventies is 350,000 housing starts, based on
household formations and in-migration.2 If Boise aimed for
5% of this market, they could achieve a volume of 17,500 for
the decade, or an average of 1750 per year.
1 Study of the small versus the large firms.in slow market
situations has been done between 1965 and 1970 in Montgomery
County, Maryland, by Gene Saminski, in an as yet unpublished
study for HUD, and between 1950 and 1960 by John Herzog, in
The Dynamics of the Large-Scale Homebuilding Firm, a study of
the northern California market. (Berkeley: Real Estate
Research Program, University of California.)
Both studies found that the small firms have considerable
trouble obtaining construction and permanent financing, and
they are frequently unable to compete price-wise, in a slow
market with the giant firms.
2Census data indicate the following growth for 1971-80:
Population Growth Housing Demand
1971-75 686,000 151,600
1976-80 720,000 200,000
351,600 Total
The FHA predicts that 95% of this growth will occur in the
suburbs, that the city's share of metropolitan area population
will shrink from 27% in 1970 to 20% in 1980.
Washington Post. "City Population Falls, Md., Va. Make Gains."
Dec. 1, 1970. p. C3.
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Given this rationale for operating in the Washington
area, Boise next decided what kind of housing to build, how
much of each kind, and at what locations. A key component
of these decisions is the belief that the 200 to 300 acre
projects should sell at least 100 units per year and that the
500 to 1000 acre projects should sell at least 250 units a
year.
Production Economies:
These sales targets are based partly on considera-
tions of overhead and production economies of scale. Each
site must fully amortize the fixed costs of working at that
site. And the fixed costs are related to the number of dif-
ferent products offered at the individual site: the smaller
the sales volume at a given site, the greater the likelihood
that it will be a single-product project, as was the case at
Pheasant Run.
The sales targets for individual sites are also
related to the holding costs of raw and improved land.
Boise hopes to build out each of its projects within three
to five years; beyond that time, the' debt service costs on
the remaining unbuilt land mount so high that the homes
built on the land - if sold at the price offered in the
early years - would cut severely into profit margins.
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Cash Flow Analysis:
Because the issue of holding costs and their bearing
on overall cash flow is such a critical determinant of project
scale, it is worth examining further, with a numerical model,
how a builder works with the financial data. The numbers
used below are drawn from a townhouse project in Fairfax
County, now under construction.
A builder evaluates the feasibility of a project
by determining whether its predicted return is at least
equal to some minimum rate he has set (called the 'hurdle
rate'). Washington builders indicate that they typically
earn somewhere between 12% and 22% on projects, but screen
potential work based on a 15% hurdle rate. In other words,
projects do not always turn out as well as predicted.
When a tract of land is brought to the builder's
attention, he calculates the total number of homes it will
support, how many units can be sold each year at the site,
and the per unit raw land and improvement costs. These
calculations show him whether a 15% yield is possible.
For instance, suppose a broker approaches the
builder with a 350-acre tract zoned for five units per gross
acre, that is, 1750 houses total. The price of the tract
is $3,130,000, or $8950 per acre. The per lot raw land
price would then be $1790. The builder negotiates a purchase
contract requiring a 20% downpayment, interest only for two
years at 7%, and then a five year payout period. On a per
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lot basis, the land financing is as follows:
Raw Land Financing:
25% downpayment $358
remaining balance 1432
total cost per lot 1790
principal plus interest annually, based on
7% rate and five year terms, is $338.
In the first five years, the payments would be:
Year Interest Principal Remaining
Balance
0 358 (downpt.) 1432
1 100 1432
2 100 1432
3 100 238 1194
4 84 254 940
5 66 272 668
Land purchase agreements typically require that as
the land is built upon and sold, the full balance remaining
on the lot must be paid off. So a lot built upon and sold
at the end of year three, for instance, would have paid the
$358 downpayment, the $100 interest in each of years one,
two, and three, the $238 principal due in year 3, and the
$1194 remaining balance.
Having calculated land financing charges, the
builder next considers improvement costs. In this caser
his engineering studies indicate that each lot will cost
$3750 to improve. He intends to borrow this money, and
the going interest rate is 14%. He will improve the lots
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section by section as needed. He anticipates that the im-
provement loan will be outstanding for an average of seven
months, hence incurring a debt service charge of $315 per
house:
$3750 x 14% x 7/12 = $315
The builder plans to construct a 1500 square foot
house, and he estimates construction costs will be $10.51
per square foot, giving a total cost of $15,800. Again, he
plans to borrow this amount, paying 14% interest. He anti-
cipates that the loan will be outstanding for an average
of 5 months, incurring a debt service charge of $915:
$15,800 x 14% x 5/12 = $915
Other development costs that the builder anticipates
are sales and promotion, mortgage processing, and overhead,
which total $4750; recreational facilities, $63; and general
administrative costs of the firm, $100 during the planning
phase and $1092 in the year of construction.
In summary, expenses incurred in Year 0 are:
downpayment for land $358
first year
general adm. expenses 100
$458
1 Loans are taken in 'draws' as the money is needed, so not
until the completion of lot improvement activities is the
full loan outstanding. Lot improvement begins four to six
months ahead of construction, and the loan is paid off when
the house is sold.
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Expenses exclusive of raw land costs, occurring in
the year of actual construction, are:
land development
principal $3750
interest 315
construction
principal 15800
interest 915
sales, overhead, mtg.
processing 4750
recreation 63
general adm. 1092
$26,685
If the house sells for $29,340, and is sold in
the same year as construction occurs, then the net revenue
in that year of sale, exclusive of raw land costs, is:
Sales Revenue $29,340
-Expenses in year
of construction -26,685
Net Revenue in
Year of Sale,
exclusive of raw
land costs $ 2,655
To calculate net cash flow overall the builder
then determines the impact of raw land costs. For instance,
a house built and sold in Year 2, would have the following
cash flow:
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Year
Raw Land
downpayment
interest
principal
balance
lst year
gen. adm. exp.
net revenue in
year of sale
NET CASH FLOW
0
(358)
1 2
(100) (100)
(1432)
(100)
2655
(458) (100) 1123
Similarly, a house built and
have the following cash flow:
Year 0 1 2
sold in Year 5,
3 4
Land (raw)
downpayment
interest
principal
balance
lst year
gen. adm. exp.
net revenue in
year of sale
NET CASH FLOW
(358)
(100) (100) (100) (84) (66)
(238) (254) (272)
(668)
(100)
2655
(458) (100) (100) (338) (338) 1649
The builder does similar calculations for homes
built and sold in years three and four, and combines all
these calculations into one table:
would
5
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Year 0 1 2 3 4 5
Net Cash
Flow of
Houses Sold
in Year:
(458) (100) 1123
(458) (100) (100) 1123
(458) (100) (100)
(458) (100) (100)
(1832) (400) 823
(338) 1367
(338) (338) 1649
437 1029 1649
Present value,
discounted
at 17% (1832) (343) 600 272 550 752
Assuming that one-quarter of the homes are sold in
each of years two, three, four, and five, the internal rate
of return of the project is 17%, which exceeds the 15%
hurdle rate. 1
1 The internal rate of return is calculated by finding the dis-
count rate that equates the present value of future cash flows
to the cost of the investment. It is the return earned by
the equity invested. In this case, the builder's equity in-
vestment consisted of the following:
downpayment on land
interest payments on land
interest payments on construction loan
interest payments on land development loan
sales, overhead, and mortgage processing costs
recreation development costs
general administrative costs
2
3
4
5
TOTAL
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Now the builder can review his initial assumptions.
For instance, he perhaps conservatively estimated that he
could sell 437 houses a year. If instead he could sell 582
a year, then his yield would jump to about 19%, because he
could build out the project a year early.1 Were the project
to drag out longer than five years, the holding costs would
become overly burdensome and the hurdle rate would not be
met.
As can be seen from this model, if land cost, annual
demand, interest rates, allowable density, and desired profit
rate are fixed, then the size of the project, in terms of
acres, is a residual. If the fixed factors are altered, how-
ever, then the residual also changes. Today, one of the
givens that builders are experimenting with is demand from
different submarkets. If, for instance, a builder has the
production capability to construct five hundred units annually
at a given site but feels that he can sell only 350 single-
family units at that site in a year, then he will consider
what other product he might add to his line to fully utilize
his production capability. For instance, he might decide
that a mix of 300 single-family and 200 townhouses units would
be marketable each year at one site. With such a combination
To arrive at this figure, re-calculate 'total net cash flow'
by eliminating the numbers associated with homes built in
year five; discounting this new total cash flow at 19% adds
approximately to zero, for a return to equity therefore of
19%.
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he then creates two possible alternatives. He can con-
tinue to work on smaller tracts and reap the higher yield
resulting from faster absorption, or he can work with larger
tracts and continue to enjoy the acceptable but slightly
lower yield associated with slower absorption. At first
glance, the first alternative seems the most logical from a
profit-maximization standpoint, but this is not necessarily
so. Once he builds up production momentum, it is easier
and involves less uncertainty to stay at one site for five
years than to move to a new site after two-and-a-half years.
The model above really did not take into account the fact
that the later houses coast along on the early cash outlays
for planning studies and for legal services associated with
a rezoning; that is, doing two projects instead of one, in
five years, requires double the number of rezonings, site
plans, etc. Another argument favoring the larger projects
is the possibility of spinning off some of the land for
higher-intensity use, typically a shopping center or an
employment center; such uses would yield a bonus speculative
gain on the original land purchase. This latter benefit was
recently illustrated by Levitt, which purchased, on generous
terms, a 663-acre tract in Fairfax County, Virginia, for
$7600 per acre, and then sold fifteen acres for cash at
$40,000 per acre to a shopping center developer.
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Builder's View of Ideal Project Size:
As mentioned earlier, Boise Cascade intends to experi-
ment in the next few years with both approaches. They hope
to work simultaneously on two or three 500 to 1000 acre
projects, and three or four 200 to 300 acre projects, but
anticipate that both kinds will be multi-product. The
larger communities will include single-families, townhouses,
and garden apartments, while the smaller projects may or
may not have the apartments.
The Yeonas Organization has a nearly identical
conception of ideal project size. If the firm were to
pick one ideal, it would be 400 acres in size, and would
include about one thousand families. The housing mix would
cover single-family, townhouse, and garden units. Like
Boise, Yeonas anticipates that some of its projects will
be as small as 200 acres, and others will be a good bit
larger, perhaps as much as 750 acres. But Yeonas is
definitely more restrained about the larger projects than
Boise. Yeonas is extremely concerned with the need for
flexibility in planning its communities; the firm feels
that the larger the project, the more locked in the firm
is to the early product mix offered and the greater the
chance that a shifting market will make the later years of
a large project unsuccessful. Yeonas is perhaps overly
sensitive to the need for flexibility because of the in-
ventory of unsold higher-priced homes it had on hand at the
end of 1970; that experience emphasized the point that
demand can shift faster than production and planning can be
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re-geared. In effect, Yeonas' concern with flexibility is
a reflection of the firm's fear that it will be unable to
read changes in submarkets early enough to avoid over-
building. Right now, Yeonas feels that it cannot accurately
foretell the market more than three years in advance. Boise
puts the outer limit on market readings at about five years,
but most of the other Washington builders agree with Yeonas.
This disparity may be because Boise has a more sophisticated
market research operation, coordinated at the central and
regional offices, and supplemented by local consultants.
In general, though, market research is a weak area, even
among the big builders, and this weakness, coupled with
other factors, limits the willingness of the builders to
work on projects with too long a time horizon.
LOCATION AND PRODUCT PACKAGE:
Projects of less than 500 acres can be built in two
types of locations, either on the extreme fringe with a
fifty to seventy minute drive to Washington, or on more ex-
pensive closer-in land forty to fifty minutes from downtown.
In other words, there is still land available forty to fifty
minutes from town that is both assemblable and priced low
enough to support homes under $38,000 in price.
For the big builders who have already decided on a
price range under $38,000, the choice of location - and
hence land cost per unit - is a key determinant of the
final product package of house plus amenities, that is
offered. The builder can produce the identical unit on the
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fringe and closer in, and let the house price reflect the
difference in location. The builder must surmise how large
a market there will be for the two different packages.
Alternatively, the builder can offer an identically-
priced unit at both locations, but include swimming pool
privileges and heavier landscaping in the package on the
fringe. Again, he must determine what the demand will be
for these two different offerings.
This issue was raised in a slightly different way
in a market analysis done for Reston in 1967. Homes at
Reston were compared with those at Levitt's Greenbriar. Both
communities are about a forty minute drive from the city.
The study showed that $25,200 at Greenbriar would buy a
detached house containing 2000 square feet, while at Reston
the same money would buy only a 1400 square foot townhouse.
Put another way, a $25,200 detached house at Greenbriar would
cost $36,000 at Reston.1 The Reston home, to make up for
the loss in house size, offered a full range of recreational
activities as soon as the homebuyer moved in,2 walking proximity
to a community and commercial center, extensive landscaping,
and extremely sensitive site planning and architecture.
Indications are that Reston sold 125 townhouses in
the $22,000 to $30,000 range in the same year that Levitt
sold four hundred single-family units in the identical price
1 Kaplan-Gans, Reston Market Analysis. 1967.
2The more common occurrence is for recreational facilities
to be built only after thirty to fifty percent of the
housing units have been built.
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range. That is, the demand for the 'stripped down' Levitt
package was about three times as high as for the Reston
'house plus amenities' package.
So far, builders have not studied formally these
questions of demand for different, but still low-priced,
packages. But the variety is being offered and is susceptible
of study. For instance, two projects which should be com-
pared are Dale City and Lake Ridge. Both are on the extreme
fringe, about an hour's drive from Washington. Dale City
offers townhouses and single-family units priced from
$22,000 to $38,000; emphasis is completely on the house it-
self, with attention focused on interior living space and
lot size. Lake Ridge, like Reston, offers a package approach;
scenic beauty and recreational amenities are emphasized.
The price range is the same as that at Dale City, so com-
parably priced homes are smaller.
In 1970, Dale City sold just over one thousand homes,
while Lake Ridge's volume was about 450.
These two comparisons, Lake Ridge and Dale City, and
Greenbriar and Reston, must be carried much further before
builders can respond with more accuracy to the consumer
desire for a mixture of location and product package.
PRICE SPREAD, MIXTURE OF AGE GROUPS, CLASSES, AND RACES
Strategies on Price Spread:
Most of the giant builders have decided to focus their
production on homes costing somewhere between $22,000 and
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$32,000. They choose to work within this relatively narrow
price spread for reasons of production simplicity and
greater marketability.
The big builders are almost unanimous in the feeling
that "It's just so tough to get up a single house successfully,
how could we possibly offer models in two or three price
ranges?" Fred Kober, Washington regional director for Boise
Cascade, reports that he must constantly discipline himself
to maintain a relatively limited product line, because if
he let himself follow his inclinations for more variety,
he could not adequately coordinate his high-volume operation.
In terms of sales acceptance, most of the builders
agree that any one project should have a price spread between
highest and lowest cost unit of no more than $10,000. Any
wider spread, to their thinking, would result in slow sales
acceptance. A narrow price spread is a means of establishing
a relatively homogeneous community in terms of income, class,
and race, a feature which seems to be preferred by most
suburbanites. As one in-depth study of subdivision-dwellers
suggests, this consumer preference may be more a reflection
of a desire for minimization of potential neighborhood con-
flict over daily living and childcare practices than of
antidemocratic hostility to people of different backgrounds.1
1Herbert Gans. The Levittowners. New York: Pantheon Books.
Gans observes that the Levittowners sought neighbors of simi-
lar age and income because "they wanted neighbors and friends
with common interests and sufficient consensus of values to
make for informal and uninhibited relations... Their reasons
were motivated neither by antidemocratic feelings nor by an
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Additionally, the builders' offering of a narrow
price spread is based on the consumers' feeling that the
resale value of a house is lessened if the house is in
a neighborhood with too many homes of visibly lower value.2
Of course, both these reasons for narrow price
spread are used by some suburbanites to mask their less
acceptable feelings of outright racial and class bigotry.
Despite the attitudes of the majority of homebuilders
and homebuyers, the new towns do not follow a policy of nar-
row price spread. In Washington's two new towns, Reston
and Montgomery Village, prices now range from $24,000 to,
$80,000. There are several explanations for this extreme
difference in marketing strategy.
First, the new towns are substantially bigger and
interest in conformity. Children need playmates of the same
age, and because child-rearing problems vary with age, mothers
like to be near women who have children of similar age. And
because these problems also fluctuate with class, they want
some similarity of that factor - not homogeneity of occupa-
tion so much as agreement on the ends and means of caring
for child, husband, and home." p. 167.
2Edward P. Eichler and Marshall Kaplan. The Community
Builders. Berkeley: University of California Press. 1967.
Chapters 6 and 7.
Eichler and Kaplan report that builders and the planners they
hire are often in conflict over the issue of what kind of
lifestyle to provide for in the new housing projects. The
planners, according to Eichler and Kaplan, in aspiring to
aristocratic values for aesthetics and to democratic ideals
of social mixing, harbor a deep antipathy for the American
middle class, "...but businessmen are forced to remind them-
selves and their planners that this very middle class is
the market to which their project must appeal." p. 10.
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must attempt to reach more submarkets if they are to sell
enough units a year to meet holding costs.
Second, because the new towns are bigger, the upper-
income housing can be segregated into the prestigious
enclaves that the builders assume are desired by this group.
This is in fact what is done with many of the higher-priced
units at both Reston and Montgomery Village.
Third, the buyers at the new towns may be less con-
cerned with having a homogeneous community than other sub-
urbanites. Buyers at the new towns have proven to be a
self-selected group with substantially different priorities
contributing to their purchase decision. This attitudinal
difference is suggested in a 1970 survey which revealed a
greater willingness among new town residents to live in a
community of mixed income and race, than residents in less
formally-planned communities.1
Fourth, at Reston, many different builders are at
work so the problems of one firm producing a wide variety
of house types is not encountered. Montgomery Village,
however, is being built and developed by one firm, Kettler
Brothers. Over the past five years, Kettler's experience
has covered houses ranging from $38,000 to $90,000 and has
1 Washington Post. "Reston, Columbia Pay Little Heed to
Social Status." January 14, 1971. P. El.
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included some commercial construction as well. This variety
of building expertise will no doubt make the task of reaching
for the lower-priced market this coming year an easier one.
Montgomery Village is the firm's primary building site, and
Kettler may feel that, having worked at the site for four
years now, it is easier to expand the product line to attain
higher volume, than to move to several other locations sim-
ultaneously. Additionally, the holding costs of the raw
land and improvements are pressuring Kettler to seek broader
markets for higher volumes. And finally, Kettler has felt
the extreme shrinkage in the higher-priced market. Other
builders, watching the new Kettler effort, are skeptical
that Kettler will be able to continue marketing its higher-
priced homes successfully once they start to push the lower-
priced homes actively. They reason that the advertising for
the $22,000 to $28,000 houses will scare away the $55,000
and up buyers. Reston avoids this problem by having its
different builders advertise their individual products;
Kettler tries to simulate this by advertising differently-
named communities within Montgomery Village, but no one is
sure whether this ploy will work in the coming year when
the price spread will be wider than ever before.
Since the new towns account for only 4% of Washington's
housing starts, the vast majority of homebuyers will live
in communities with a $10,000 or less price spread. Focusing
on the $22,000 to $32,000 range, let us examine the mixture
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of people by income, age, occupational class, and race, that
are likely to occur within the communities offering this
price spread.
Buyer Profiles, by Income and Age:
Housing purchasing power correlates closely with in-
come and with equity build-up, and these factors in turn
correlate with both age and class. For instance, a family
buying its first home would have to earn about $12,000 be-
fore it could afford to purchase a $30,000 house; if this
were a second home and the family were prepared to transfer
equity from the old house to the new one, then a $10,000
income might be adequate to sustain the costs of a $30,000
purchase. 1
Families aged 34 and under are most likely making
a first purchase, while older homebuying couples have a
high probability of being second-round purchasers.
1Robert Zalakar, first vice president of First Virginia Bank,
Virginia's largest bank, reports that his mortgage loan
department requires that the monthly mortgage payment on a
home loan not exceed 20% of a family's gross monthly income.
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The effect of equity-transfer on house purchasing
power is indicated by the following table, which shows,
for different age groups, the income needed to purchase a
house of a given price.1
House Price Income Required
Age 34 and Under Age 35-44 Age 45-64
$20,000 $7,000 $7,000 $7,000
30,000 12,000 11,000 10,000
40,000 16,000 15,000 13,000
50,000 20,000 17,000 16 ,000
60,000 24,000 21,000 20,000
70,000 30,000 26,000 25,000
80,000 32,000 28,000 27,000
In purchasing power, older couples have an advantage
not only due to equity build-up, but also because they tend
to earn more. For instance, in 1969, 31% of Washington
couples aged 45 to 64 earned $15,000 and up, compared to
2
23% of those aged 35 to 44, and 8.5% of those 34 and younger.
Translating income distributions for the different
age groups into house purchasing power, the following buyer
profiles emerge:
1 This information is gathered from mortgage lenders and
brokers in Northern Virginia.
2
"Survey of Purchasing Power." Sales Management. P. C-30.
June, 1969.
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PURCHASING POWER OF COUPLES AGED 25 to 341
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0
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House Price ($000's omitted)
PURCHASING POWER OF COUPLES AGED 35 to 44
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lShaded area shows percent of families interested in the
$22,000 to $32,000 price range.
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Focusing on the price range $22,000 to $32,000,
the buyer profiles indicate that 40% of the under 34 age
group fall in this submarket, 25% of the 35 to 44 group,
and 20% of the 45 to 64 group.
Coupling this data with the percentage distribution
by age group in the Washington area, we can ascertain the
following:
(a) (b) (a) (b)
Age Group Age Group as % of Age Group % of Total
% of Total Wash. Able to Buy Pop. by
Population, $22,000 - Group,Able
1970 $32,000 Homes to Buy
$22-32,000
Home
Less than 34 26.4% 40% 10.6%
35-44 19.2% 25% 4.8%
45-64 37.4% 20% 7.5%
22.9%
If families of different ages were all equally likely to
be in the market for home purchasing, the above table in-
dicates that roughly 23% of all Washington families would
be looking for homes priced $22,000 to $32,000, and of these
families, just under half (10.6%/22.9%) would be in the
under 34 age group, one-fifth would be aged 35-44, and
one third would be 45 to 64.
But families of different ages are not equally
likely to be in the market for homes. The older the family,
the greater the likelihood that it already owns a house,
and even though family size may have increased and income
risen since that initial purchase, there are factors which
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militate against the older family's being interested in
moving. Most important is the impact of rising labor,
land, and material costs in the construction industry.
Impact of Housing Price Spiral on Buyer Profile:
For example, the Kings Park subdivision in Fairfax
County, Virginia opened in 1962. It is a thirty minute drive
from the city. Most of the initial purchasers were young
couples, aged 34 and under, with incomesbetween $8,000 and
$10,000. They bought homes priced $21,000 to $25,000, with
1500 to 1800 square feet. Now, eight years later, these
couples are about 30 to 40 years old and earning $12,000 to
$16,000. Their families have expanded and they feel the need
for more spacious homes. But they cannot find, in a com-
parable commuting radius, homes that meet their new needs
and that are also within their purchasing power. They can
afford homes that are about $33,000 to $43,000. Ironically,
that is almost exactly what their current homes are selling
for on the resale market. To find a four bedroom 2100
square foot home, they would have to pay at least $50,000
to stay .within 30 minutes of town, or they would have to
move ten to twenty miles further out from the city to find
the right size home in their price range.
This example illustrates that the price spiral in
the homebuilding industry has far out-paced the inflationary
and 'earned' rise in income of the general homebuying
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public.1 This phenomenon effectively forces most home-
owners to remain in their current dwellings or move further
1965
New Home
Price
Cost of
Living
Average
Weekly
Pay
$22,700
110
95
1970 Percentage Increase
$33,700
138
122
50%
25%
28%
Housing Price Spiral 2
away from the city. (In Washington, most purchasers in the
over 35 age group are families who have just changed jobs;
this is a larger than usual group in Washington due to the
high proportion of military and government workers.)
The Association of General Contractors of America predicts
that recent labor settlements, coupled with rising material
costs, will result in a 7% increase in direct construction
costs in 1971. "Construction Costs Still Rising." Washington
Post, Jan. 9, 1971.
2Wall Street Journal. "The Outlook" Jan. 11, 1971, p. 1,
New Home Price is the median selling price of new homes
covered by conventional mortgages. Cost of living index
is the official one (1957-59 = 100). Average weekly wage
figures are compiled by the Department of Labor.
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Therefore, the age distribution of persons looking
for homes is highly skewed toward the young side. Although
no formal studies have been conducted, builders report the
following assumptions regarding age and likelihood of house
purchase: in the under 34 group, 80% of those able to buy
such homes will in fact be looking for homes. In the 35-44
group, 40% will be looking; this number may seem high at
first, but recall that couples in this age group who are
looking for the low-priced homes may have just recently
acquired the financial means to buy a home; in other words,
many in this category will be first-home purchasers. In the
45-64 group, about 10% of those able to buy the lower-
priced homes will be interested in doing so.
Applying these percentages to earlier findings:
Age Group % of Total % by Age % of Total Pop.
Pop., by Group, by Age, Likely
Age Group, Likely to to be Seeking
Able to be Seeking $22-32,000
Buy a $22- Home of Home
32,000 home $22-32,000
less than 34 10.6% 80% 8.4%
34-44 4.8% 40% 1.9%
45-64 7.5% 10% .8%
Focusing on the last column, we can derive the age distribution
of families likely to be purchasing $22,000 to $32,000 homes:
Age Group % of Lower-Priced Buyers
less than 34 75%
35-44 17%
45-64 8%
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Buyer Profile, by Occupational Class and Age:
Income rises with age, and the wage differential
between white and blue collar workers also increases with age.
Therefore, the older age groups interested in purchasing
$22,000 to $32,000 homes are likely to have a much higher
proportion of blue collar workers than are the under -34
couples. These facts are borne out by recent sales ex-
perience; builders find that the youngest buyers of lower-
priced homes are predominantly white collar workers, while
the older buyers are mostly blue collar workers. So in this
price range, age is a close surrogate for occupational class.
The mixture of different ages and classes that occurs
in any given community has not been studied extensively by
the builders yet, but certain trends are emerging. At
Sudley, a townhouse project selling for $25,000 to $30,000,
the average age of the buyers was twenty-two; virtually 100%
of the couples were 'young marrieds.' At Lake Braddock,
townhouses priced $28,000 to $32,000 attracted young marrieds
and older couples in almost equal numbers. The difference
in the appeal of the two projects, both done by the Yeonas
Organization, was in the product package. Sudley is located
in Manassas, Virginia, at least an hour's drive from the
city, while Lake Braddock is a thirty-five minute commute.
Sudley emphasized the house itself, while Lake Braddock
focused on a variety of community amenities. Most
significantly, Yeonas found that the Lake Braddock homes on
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the 'premium' lots overlooking lakes and stream valleys
were consistently purchased by the older couples, and that
the older couples tended to buy the smaller three bedroom
model homes.
Comparing families of equal income, the older the
family, the greater the likelihood that it will be willing
to live in a smaller home in return for better location,
better view, or more community facilities. So the exact
product package offered by the builders will be a key
determinant of the extent to which the lower-priced com-
munities will have a diversity of age and class groups.
Given that roughly three-quarters of buyers in the $22,000
to $32,000 price range are likely to be under age 34, most
communities are bound to aim for this age group: the pre-
dominant package will likely be the "stripped down" house
in the fringe location; competing for second place will be
the stripped down house closer in to the city and the "house
plus amenities" package on the fringe. The Lake Braddock
kind of offering - superior location, and "house plus amenities' -
will be the least frequent offering in the lower price range.
Buyer Profile, by Race:
The price range of the new suburban housing, starting
generally at a minimum of $22,000, restricts buyers by in-
come, and by corollary, by race as well. The large suburban
homebuilders, when queried as to the racial composition of
their communities, replied that their homes were open to blacks
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and whites, so long as the families could afford the down-
payment and could qualify for the mortgage. In the
Washington area, few Negro families can meet these financial
qualifications, though, and the new subdivisions are vir-
tually all white.
MIX OF NON-RESIDENTIAL AND RESIDENTIAL LAND USES:
Turning from the issue of 'people' to 'land use'
mix, one finds the giant builders in Washington planning to
orient their land development operations primarily toward
residential construction and its direct ancillary facilities,
Commercial Center:
The giant builders intend to concentrate on projects
of at least two hundred acres and/or six hundred homes. This
size subdivision provides an adequate market to support a
convenience goods shopping center. Since homebuyers like
such facilities nearby, and since profits from the develop-
ment of the commercial center are high, the builders will
uniformly include them in their projects.
Open Space:
Open space for recreation is likely to be another
standard feature. All the Washington suburban jurisdictions
permit a bonus of extra units if the builder designs his
project on a cluster basis and creates more open space.
For instance, in Fairfax County, a builder who buys land
zoned for 2.5 units per acre will actually be permitted to
build 3.3 units per acre if he uses an acceptable cluster
plan. The bonus units, plus the lower lot improvement costs
associated with cluster, are strong incentives favoring
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the conservation of open space.
Recreational Facilities:
A third standard feature will be at least one
swimming pool in each project. Virtually all communities
with more than one hundred homes built in the Washington
area over the past five years have included swimming pools.
Consumers of even the most 'stripped down' package have come
to expect the pool as part of that package. Any builder
failing to include a pool would be at a severe competitive
disadvantage. The inclusion of additional recreational
facilities, such as tennis courts, boating and swimming
lakes, and stables, will depend on the size of the project
and the perceived demand for such products. The larger
projects - over 500 acres and 1000 units - have a big ad-
vantage in that they can spread the cost of the additional
facilities over more units; buyers will be attracted to
the fact that the large communities have a lake and a stable,
and will not necessarily notice that these amenities will be
crowded when the project is fully built out.
Employment Centers:
None of the big Washington builders, with the
exception of the new towns, has any intention of including
employment centers along with their residential communities.
They feel that, at present, it would be much too difficult
to coordinate the planning, construction, financing, and
leasing of industrial or office space, along with their
primary task of homebuilding. They recognize that commercial
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construction is a completely different business, and do
not feel that success in homebuilding necessarily carries
over to another field. While they have no plans to in-
ternalize a commercial construction operation, a few of the
builders would consider selling off land suited for an
employment center or would joint venture with an experi-
enced commercial developer. The builders are extremely
eager to maintain complete control within their own
projects, however, so the prospect of working with another
firm is not warmly regarded. The enticement of a speculative
gain on a land sale will likely be the deciding factor on
whether residential communities of the big builders have
employment centers. The argument that an employment base
would generate extra housing demand is not persuasive with
the builders; they feel that the difficulties of overseeing
a commercial operation outweigh any additional demand
generated. Even if the builders were able to put up 100,000
square feet of industrial or office space a year, the 400
employees working in that amount of space would likely
generate a deiand for well under 100 houses. 1
The builders do not particularly regret being unable,
100,000 square feet a year in the fringe locations would
in fact be quite unusual; such a volume is today attained
only at prime close-in suburban sites. The assumption that
fewer than one in four employees would be potential home-
buyers would be grossly incorrect only if the newly located
firm has moved from a far distant location, probably from
another metropolitan area.
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production-wise, to include an employment center. They
feel that other developers are facilitating the decentrali-
zation of office and industrial space quickly enough al-
ready, so that while fringe locations today are an hour's
drive from downtown, they will be thirty minutes or less
from a substantial portion of the metropolitan area's
employment centers, within ten years.
SUMMARY:
The housing project that builders feel is most
responsive to consumer demand and to their own business
constraints, over the next five to ten years, is a three
hundred to six hundred acre community, housing nine hundred
to two thousand families. The project will be in a fringe
location, fifty to sixty minutes from downtown. It will
include single--family homes, townhouses, and possibly garden
apartments, priced between $22,000 and $32,000. Emphasis
will be on the number of square feet of interior space that
one is buying. The community will have a neighborhood com-
mercial center and several swimming pools; other recreational
facilities could be offered if the initial land purchase is
on unusually favorable terms or if the project is unusually
large. The predominant consumers will be young married
couples under the age of 34, earning about $8500 to
$13,000.
The chief variation on this typical project will be
a closer-in community, and/or one with more amenities, and
with a broader age range of consumers.
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These project types contrast sharply to the typical
project that has been built over the past five years: the
ten to three-hundred fifty acre subdivision, with ten to
one thousand units all of one type (either all townhouse
or all single-family), and selling for $40,000 and up to
middle-aged second-round purchasers and a few extremely
well-to-do younger couples.
CHAPTER THREE
POSSIBILITIES FOR ACHIEVING BOTH
QUALITY AND QUANTITY
UNITED STATES URBAN GROWTH GOALS:
The goals for new urban development in the United
States, as conceived in the 1970 Housing and Urban Develop-
ment Act, embody two distinct principles: quantity and
quality. One goal is the provision of adequate housing
to the current population and to the seventy-five million
additional persons expected to swell our census between now
and 2000; Secretary Romney has expressed the hope that the
housing industry can produce at least two million new units
in 1971 and at least thirty million by 1980. A second stated
goal in the 1970 legislation is the development of well-
planned communities, such that they provide a full range of
housing for people of all incomesages, classes, and races,
that they be responsive to the variety of present and future
needs of consumers, and that they provide a full range Qf
land uses within easy access of one another.
Comparing these urban growth goals to the likely
pattern of development projected for the Washington metro-
politan area over the next decade - as described in Chapter
Two - it is clear that the goals of "quality!' will not be
63
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met. For at least the next five years builders will not
be providing a full range of land uses within single com-
munities, they will not try to appeal to the full scope of
the potential submarkets, and they are not likely to build
housing for lower income and minority groups. However,
the giant builders will contribute enormously to the goal
of rapidly expanding the nation's housing stock, and it
would be unfair to upbraid the giant builders for lacking
aesthetic sensitivity, planning logic, and a fealty to open
housing opportunity, without acknowledging their tremendous
accomplishments in providing sheer volume.
If, in the long-run, the United States is committed
to the achievement of quantity and quality simultaneously,
then it must be prepared to undertake a great deal of re-
search and to make a significant number of government policy
changes.
TWO RESEARCH STRATEGIES:
In search of these goals, two basic research strategies
starting from opposite poles, may be in order. One, we can
continue to subsidize the currently unprofitable new town
ventures, which embody the ideals of' "quality" community
planning, and concentrate on methods of making the new towns
capable of providing significant volumes of housing. Two,
we can analyze the high-volume housing producers, and seek
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ways to make them capable of providing higher quality com-
munities.
Hopefully, both these research strategies would
evolve solutions that make the combination of quantity and
quality feasible within a private market, profit-making
framework. Or the research should indicate just how much
the country must be willing to pay, in terms, for instance,
of underwriting large land purchases or of accepting a
slower than possible pace of housing production, in order
to achieve the dual objective.
Since the focus of this paper has been primarily
on the giant homebuilders, let us continue this focus
here, asking, "how can the high-volume producers contribute
more to the achievement of 'quality' urban growth?"
INCREASING THE RESPONSIVENESS OF BUILDERS TO CONSUMER DEMANDS
AND NEEDS:
Before the giant builders can launch themselves into
a well-articulated urban growth program, they require a great
deal more information about the variety of housing needs and
desires of the different consumer submarkets.
At present, only 12 percent of all builders engage
in formal market analysis. The remainder rely on intuition
and past experience. One reason for the informality of
1 Sumichrast, p. 163.
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market research is that most builders today are small local
firms who feel they can keep abreast of consumer demand and
competitors' plans just by remaining generally alert. The
propensity of these firms to go out of business or suffer
heavily in the face of bigger competitors, when demand shifts
or credit tightens, does not seem to have altered their
method of market analysis.
There is another reason, however, in addition to mere
reluctance, for the generally intuitive approach to market
analysis: the state of the art of market analysis is quite
primitive today. At present, only the crudest of questions,
based on basic demographic data, are being answered. In-
terested builders are barely able to gather information on
the size of submarkets by age, income, and family size, for
local areas, let alone determine the tastes of these sub-
markets for alternative 'packages' of house and community
which the builder might offer.
Local Centralization of Market Information:
Local governments and metropolitan agencies could
make a significant contribution to the improvement of market
information if they would centrali.ze the data needed by
builders. Most communities have no centralized data
1John Gillies and Frank Mittelbach. Management in the Light
Construction Industry. University of California: Real
Estate Research Program. 1962, p. 16.
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collection for real estate activity: the Chamber of Commerce
keeps tabs on incoie andspending habits, the assessor watches
rents and land volumes, the building inspector has informa-
tion on building permit issues, and the planning department
keeps data on proposed population increases. For a large-
scale builder operating in more than one jurisdiction, the
task of collecting information from each agency of each com-
munity is onerous.
National Information-Gathering System:
This lack of central real estate market information
is true on a national scale as well. As described in Chapter
Two, the national firms must analyze many metropolitan areas
to determine which ones have fast enough growth rates over
a long enough period of time to merit the firm's establishing
a regional operation. Currently the giant national builders
are clustered in a very few metropolitan areas; if their
high-volume production capability is desired elsewhere,
perhaps an improved set of market information would show them
that there are opportunities in many additional locations
which have not yet been recognized.
The Federal Government should therefore consider
the establishment of a national information-gathering system.
Such a system would necessarily have to be based upon an
improved local system. It appears that many communities do
have the raw data needed for an information network, and
all that is needed is a guidebook on how to present this
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information so that it is all in one place and so that it
is roughly consistent from community to community.
Studying the Demand for Alternative Packages:
In addition to basic information on the size of
submarkets by age, income, and family size, builders and
consumers would be better off if more were known about the
relative attractiveness of the various 'packages' that
could be offered. Each builder's product includes trade-
offs among price, number of interior square feet, lot
size, location, recreational amenities, landscaping, site
planning, building materials, etc. So far, the choice as
to which combination of characteristics to offer where and
in what numbers has been highly intuitive. Such questions
as the following are in great need of answers:
--What percentage of consumers in each submarket
value a short journey to work more than a full range of
community facilities, given the same size and price house
in both alternatives?
--What percentage of consumers in each submarket
value a full range of community facilities more than a
large house, given the same price house and same journey-
to-work?
Local governments, or more likely, metropolitan or
regional planning bodies, are in a better position than
the builders to study such questions. While the builders
have ready access to the consumers in their own communities,
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they have much. more difficulty getting a high response rate
from buyers in competitors' communities. The giant builders
in Washington almost uniformly have their purchasers fill
out a questionnaire once the buying decision is firmly made,
but even these surveys provide only minimal information that
can be used to revise community design plans. Typically,
the information collected yields a profile of consumers that
outlines age, income, family size, occupation, location of
workplace, location and price of previous home, and major
reasons for buying the present home.
Such information is useful in two ways. If the
project under study is selling well, the builder has a
clear picture of his most likely buyers and can refine his
advertising to aim directly at these consumers. If the
project is not selling quickly enough, the builder can
analyze his buyer profile to determine whether the particular
submarket he is attracting is demographically too small to
meet his target sales rate; he can then draw up an alternative
profile of a hopefully larger submarket, and alter his package
to attract this new buyer.
A metropolitan planning agency's survey of consumer
preferences could be much more far-reaching in its ability
to compare and contrast features of different communities.
And the information gathered would be available publically.
Smaller building firms, who now work almost totally on
intuition, would then be on a par, at least information-
wise, with the larger builders. And each builder could
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examine the collected data and more effectively choose a
market strategy that is consistent with his ideal project
scale, time horizon, and overall sales volume.
Another advantage of publically-sponsored consumer
research would be a clearer picture of current 'holes' in
the market: groups of consumers and types of packages that
builders currently neglect. No doubt some of these missed
submarkets exist because of cost constraints. But others
exist simply because builders have failed to recognize them.
This latter case is especially true among middle-aged and
elderly middle-income and upper-income persons. These groups
are shrinking as a proportion of housing consumers, and so,
as seen in the Washington area, their housing needs are being
left increasingly to the small and medium-sized builders.
Yet it is these builders who are the least innovative, the
least research-oriented firms in the industry. Their con-
sumers have the greatest chance of being poorly served in
terms of accurate response to real needs.
ACHIEVING A FULLER RANGE OF HOUSING, BY AGE, INCOME, CLASS,
AND RACE, WITHIN INDIVIDUAL COMMUNITIES:
In the Washington area during the 1970's, the emerging
sociological composition of the newly-built suburbs is homo-
genous groupings of white middle class young families, occa-
sionally joined by white middle-aged blue collar families.
In contrast, the new towns will continue to provide a
significantly diversified mixture of age, income, class,
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and racial groups.
Since the 1970 Federal housing legislation espouses
a goal of "increasing, for all persons, particularly me-mbers
of minority groups, the available choices of location for
living and working...", it appears, at least on the surface,
that the projects of the merchant builders will be incon-
sistent with U. S. urban growth objectives. Yet while ad-
vocating that a "full range" of housing opportunities be
available in the suburbs in general, the legislation seeks
to implement this goal specifically only in the new towns.
In the new towns, a pre-requisite for federal funding is the
"substantial provision (of) housing within the means of per-
sons of low and moderate income." In the more conventional
suburbs, the 1970 legislation and the current administrative
practices of the Federal Government imply a laissez-faire
attitude regarding minority and low-income housing: the
le-gislation provides no explicit guidelines to encourage
merchant builders to diversify their offerings and the
Departments of Justice and Housing and Urban Development
have made apparent their unwillingness to take action in
such matters.1
1President Nixon and Attorney General Mitchell have both given
speeches expressing their opposition to any Federal policy of
forced integration. And the Civil Rights CQrmission recently
conducted a study which found HUD had "abdicated its responsi-
bility to low-income buyers and the law" by allowing housing
built for Negroes under the Section 235 program to be con-
sistently chanelled into existing black areas or into already
integrated "changing" neighborhoods. (As reported by Peter
Braestrup in The Washington Post: "HUD Perpetuates Bias,
Rights Report Charges." April 18, 1971, pA 1.)
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Therefore, the emerging Washington suburbs will likely
be an accurate reflection of implicit U. S. housing policy
with regard to the range of people mixed into any single com-
munity. It is unlikely that Federal housing policies will
shift dramatically on this issue until a much broader seg-
ment of middle class Americans demonstrates a willingness
to open their communities voluntarily to lower-income and
non-white families. And, similarly, it is unlikely that
merchant builders will provide for these groups in their
suburban projects until it is clear that a majority of home-
buyers will purchase homes in mixed communities.
In addition to middle-class resistance, another
barrier to suburban housing for lower-income families is
cost. The Federal government has recognized the need for
public subsidy to bridge the gap between purchasing power
and actual cost, and has adopted legislation to accomplish
this task. Actual implementation of the '235' and '236'
programs has been hampered by insufficient funding, by ad-
ministrative and regulatory tangles, and by difficulty in
finding housing sites.
On the local level, governments genuinely interested
in facilitating lower-cost housing have turned their attention
to building and subdivision codes. Fairfax and Montgomery
Counties have set up study groups to revise their codes so
as to lower lot improvement and construction costs.
Research teams composed of county officials, citizens, and
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private builders and engineers, have drawn up proposals
over the past year which are now being studied by elected
officials; these proposals are meeting with popular favor
in the press and among citizens' associations and are likely
to be adopted within six months. Anticipated cost savings,
if the proposals are implemented, would be "in excess of
$5000 on a single-family house designed to sell for $28,000."l
In Fairfax, the Yeonas Organization has taken the lead in
conducting research into cost-cutting measures. Yeonas had
its own engineering consultants draw up a proposal which
was in large part absorbed into the County's official task
force report; the Yeonas proposals are being implemented on
a trial basis at Lake Braddock, where Yeonas is building 361
moderate-income units.
These promising local efforts can, unfortunately,
contribute in only a small way to solving the low-income
housing problem. Further refinement of federal housing
legislation, a much greater commitment of federal funds to
housing subsidies, and a lessening of middle class resistance,
are all required before any significant progress can be made.
MATCHING ZONING POLICIES WITH MARKET DEMAND:
An area in which local governments could take the
lead in improving the ultimate product of the big builders
"Preliminary Report of the Task Force on Housing, Fairfax
County, Virginia." Fairfax County: Planning Staff. 1971,
p. 2.
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is in the sound application of market data to zoning policies.
Currently, local governments zone their unbuilt land based on
an idealized concept of land use. This ideal is often out
of phase with the needs of the current homebuying public.
Many local governments recognize this mismatch, but
persist in such policies as large-lot zonings as an ex-
clusionary policy and as one which holds down the costs of
the public infra-structure. There are other suburbs, how-
ever, which are extremely eager to attract new development
at a fast pace, often to amortize the cost of already-built
facilities, or, as with Fairfax and Montgomery Counties, to
provide low-enough-cost housing to be affordable by school-
teachers, policemen, and others who serve the counties. It
is these latter suburbs which would benefit from a revised
zoning process which takes more account of consumer needs
and builder cost constraints.
For instance, in Fairfax County, the planning process
begins when public officials and planners agree upon an over-
all target population for a given region. This population
is then parcelled out into X one-acre lots, Y half-acre lots,
etc., and a public improvements building program is scheduled
to handle the overall population. The principles on which
the relative percentages of each lot size are based are quite
unclear. The planners readily admit that lot development
costs, raw land costs, and resultant demand for each density
category are not considered.
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Steps in the Zoning Process:
For a start, local governments should institute a
regular review of existing zoning categories of unbuilt land.
Along with the list of numbers of acres in each zoning category
should be an estimate of the raw land costs per unit and lot
improvement costs. With these figures, the local government
should then project the price of homes that can be built on
the vacant land. These calculations will yield an estimate
of the county's potential supply of land for housing, by
price range.
Next, the county should assess the demand for housing,
by submarkets, to ascertain what proportion of the population
falls into each price category home.
The County should then set two targets: one, the
mix of persons of each submarket desired within a single
region, and two, the length of time over which it is fin-
ancially feasible to have a district in the development
stage.
Then the County must reconcile these two targets:
for instance, if it wants a district to develop over ten
years, then it cannot also ask that half the district be
inhabited by upper-income families on two-acre lots, since
that submarket is too small to meet the ten-year build-out
target.
This process of constraining the ideal mix of sub-
markets by taking into account the size of the individual
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Outline of Proposed Zoning Process:
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I
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submarkets and the costs of the infra-structure over time,
is a critical discipline which is currently missing from the
planning process, yet it is a discipline which has signifi-
cant benefits to the-County, to builders, and to homebuyers.
Benefits of Revized Zoning Policy:
In developing new regions, Counties typically lay
out major roads, trunk sewers, and water mains, at the
start of the development period. They sell bonds to pay
the capital costs, and gradually pay off the principal and
interest with property tax revenues.
If land in the new region is developed by builders
more slowly than the County anticipates, then the infra-
structure is under-utilized and property tax revenues generated
are less than expected. Such a situation creates an unduly
heavy financial burden for existing County residents. The
market-oriented zoning policy proposed above would relieve
this excess burden.
Builders and purchasers of lower-priced housing would
benefit from the proposal because the accurate matching of
supply with demand would bring land costs down. Currently,
there is limited supply of land zoned for small lots and a
huge demand, which together create high price for the land.
Likewise, there is a huge supply of land zoned for large
lots, and a small demand, so prices on this land are de-
pressed. Realigning zoning along lines of supply and demand
in each price range and submarket would yield a greater
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supply of hilgher-density, reasonably-priced land that could
support homes in the $22,000 to $32,000 category.
INCREASING THE RANGE OF LAND USES WITHIN COMMUNITIES:
Based on the present production capabilities of
homebuilders and based on their perception of demand for
various land uses, two possible strategies might lead to
the provision of a fuller range of land uses within easy
and logical access of one another. One, local governments
could take a much more active role in coordinating the mix
of land uses, and two, the builders could gradually acquire
the capability of coordinating a broader range of con-
struction activities.
Local Government Efforts:
At present, most builders are not taking responsi-
bility for creating employment centers along with residential
concentrations. They assert that diversification beyond
residential construction is too complicated at present. They
further assert that the time horizon for the absorption of
industrial land on the fringe locations is much longer than
the time horizon for the lower-priced homes they are building,
so debt service costs would hang heavy on the industrial land
and there would be few benefits of construction economies
of scale and of interlocking demand for the two land uses.
If local governments are committed to the objective
of increasing the mix of land uses, then they will have to
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zone some land for employment uses on their own motion.
If the builders are correct about the timing of demand,
local governments pursuing this goal must not be impatient
with the time lag that will be involved in achieving a full
scale of land uses.
Builder Learning Experience:
Where time lag in demand is not a relevant factor,
that is, where builders can expect to sell out industrial
and residential land simultaneously, then the only obstacle
is managerial and production capability. The builders'
rejection of more than just homebuilding activities today
is largely a reflection of prudent business philosophy that
a firm should learn to do one thing well before branching
out. One indication of how the builders regard this learning
process is given by Levitt's handling of its new apartment
construction operation.
Levitt has traditionally been a single-family builder.
In 1969, the firm decided to branch into apartment building.
How to integrate this new activity into the existing firm
was a key management question. One obvious method was to
review the single-family projects then in the planning stage
and determine which ones could include apartments, and to
consider, in all future land purchases, whether the tracts
could support both single- and multi-family units.
Levitt chose a completely different method, however.
Rather than trying to integrate multi-family construction
into existing single-family building operations across the
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country, Levitt decided to establish a completely separate
subsidiary, Levitt Multi-Housing, This subsidiary has set
up operations in a few key metropolitan areas, seeking its
own land, and supervising its own construction and marketing.
Levitt reasons that this method of initiating its apartment
operation will be the least disruptive to the rest of the
business and will provide a good learning environment for
the new activities. Once a successful apartment construction
operation is established, Levitt anticipates a merger of
the single- and multi-family operations.2
This Levitt example, along with Boise Cascade's
reluctance to branch out beyond homebuilding, is a signi-
ficant warning indicator to government officials and others
concerned with achieving a finer integration of land uses.
Levitt and Boise Cascade are the acknowledged homebuilding
industry leaders in volume and management sophistication,
and if they are cautious and slow about starting new endeavors,
"Levitt Will Build Apartments." Engineering Record. Sept.
11, 1969. New York: McGraw Hill, p. 15. Levitt Multi-
Housing will start with conventional construction in two to
four-story buildings, in two Washington locations. Later,
the subsidiary will branch out to New York City, Philadelphia,
Chicago, and Baltimore metropolitan areas. Levitt hopes that
within a few years, apartments will represent half the firm's
total volume. (1969 volume was 7600 single-family units.)
2Comments on management strategy are from John Canning, head
of single-family land acquisition in the Washington area for
Levitt.
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the layman must assume that there are extremely good business
reasons backing up their strategy. Officials at Levitt,
Boise Cascade, and several other of the big firms consistently
assert that it is much easier to conceptualize the ideal of
mixing land uses than it is to implement that ideal.
Research and training in construction and land
development management:
This gap between the ability to conceptualize and
the ability to implement points up another area for remedial
attention. There is very little current research on the
management of homebuilding, commercial construction, and
land development. Many books were written on these subjects
in the 1950's, and early 1960's, but the literature has not
kept pace with the era of high-volume operations. This
neglect is all the more glaring when we recall that govern-
ment officials and urban planners have been vociferously
calling for over two million housing starts a year and for
dozens of new towns. Yet the government and the urban
planners have left it up to others to work out ways of
achieving these ideals. Unfortunately, those "others" have
turned out to be one of the most backward industries in
America.
The time is therefore over-ripe for universities
and governments to conduct research and promote training in
all phases of construction and land development management.
Presently there are twenty-three colleges which have specific
degree programs in construction, and these programs turn out
-82-
only three hundred fifty graduates a year. These programs
should be expanded. And existing business schools, which
are a key source of homebuilding management talent, should
be encouraged to expand their real estate programs.
To reap the full benefits of improved training of
homebuilders, an educational program should simultaneously
be established for the public officials with whom the
builders regularly interact. To help public servants
formulate master plans and regulatory codes that are more
responsive to market realities, the training of these
officials should include a rigorous analysis of the business
constraints that builders face.
CONCLUSION
Based on an exploration of homebuilders and how they
make their business decisions, it appears that great progress
will be made over the next decade toward the provision of
enough housing units to keep pace with the demand for new
shelter. Left on their own, however, builders are likely
to fall far short of this country's goals for quality com-
munities.
While producing homes in ever-increasing volumes,
the nation's hoiebuilders will group these homes into projects
which lack an exciting and efficient mix of land uses, which
are unresponsive to the variety of consumer tastes that are
latent but apparent today, and which will be closed to all
but a narrow range of homebuyers.
There are many good business reasons why 'quantity'
will be more readily achieved than 'quality': mass-production
is easier to attain by concentrating on one housing type than
many, marketing is less risky and production easier when
offerings are kept within a narrow price range, a sixteen-
hundred unit project built over four years is more flexible
to shifts in demand and less burdened with holding costs
than a five-thousand unit project built over ten years, and
a project composed solely of residential construction is
easier to coordinate than a diversified program of residential
as well as non-residential land uses.
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In order to move closer to the attainment of both
quantity and quality in the suburbs, many of the business
constraints that builders face will have to be diminished.
Some of the constraints can be lifted by the builder himself;
the lifting of others will require efforts by local, state,
and federal government agencies, and by educational in-
stitutions.
On the builder's part, as he grows in experience,
he will achieve adequate production scale and managerial
sophistication to expand his product line; this will enable
him to offer a variety of house types and a broader mixture
of land uses. Before such expansion makes good business
policy, however, others must take steps as well.
Public agencies must help create a more inclusive
and centralized market information network. Raw data cur-
rently available from local agencies must be more efficiently
assembled both locally and nationally. Inquiry into a much
broader range of housing consumer issues must be launched.
For instance, it must be shown that, demographically, there
is adequate demand simultaneously from a variety of consumers
to support a heterogeneity of price ranges; and besides sheer
numbers, it must be proved that persons of different incomes
and classes will in fact want to buy homes in mixed communities.
Research and training in the area of land develop-
ment and construction must be widened and up-dated. The
literature must catch up with a new era of homebuilding, and
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the information must be disseminated not only to future
building professionals but to public planners and others
who interact daily with builders.
Local building and subdivision codes must be revised
downward to make lower-income housing more widely feasible,
and additional legislation and funding must be sought in
order to close the gap between low incomes and housing costs,
And local zoning policies must be much more accurately
attuned to market realities so that capital improvements
are more efficiently and economically utilized and so that
land costs more correctly reflect supply-demand relations.
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